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We investigate systemic risk and how financial contagion propagates within the euro area 
banking system by employing the Maximum Entropy method. The study captures multiple 
snapshots of a dynamic financial network and uses counterfactual simulations to propagate 
shocks emerging from three sources of systemic risk: interbank, asset price, and sovereign 
credit risk markets. As conditions deteriorate, these channels trigger severe direct and indirect 
losses and cascades of defaults, whilst the dominance of the sovereign credit risk channel 
amplifies, as the primary source of financial contagion in the banking network. Systemic risk 
within the northern euro area banking system is less apparent, while the southern euro area 
banking system is more prone and susceptible to bank failures provoked by financial 
contagion. By modelling the contagion path the results demonstrate that the euro area 
banking system insists to be markedly vulnerable and conducive to systemic risks.  
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1. Introduction 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 was the earthquake 
displaying that the modern financial system was severely fragile. Global financial market 
participants were directly impacted by its default and numerous repercussions were felt 
throughout the world, resulting from a plethora of cross-border and cross-entity 
interdependencies (De Haas et al. 2012; Acharya et al. 2014). The shock was rapidly spread 
in Europe, where by the end of September, euro area governments rescued the Belgian-
French bank Dexia, demonstrating vividly that these interdependencies generate amplified 
responses to shocks and increase the speed of contagion in the financial system (Panageas 
2010; Acharya et al. 2011; Aiyar 2012, Acharya et al. 2015 inter alia). Thus, in the 
aftershock era, the effects of both interconnectedness and contagion manifested themselves 
and systemic risk emerged as one of the most challenging aspects ( Elliott et al. 2014; 
Acemoglu et al. 2015). The banking industry grappled with one overarching challenge; to 
measure and reduce systemic risk (for a definition and discussion on systemic risk and 
contagion see also Acharya et al. 2012; Liang 2013; and Allen and Carletti 2013) in order to 
improve the resilience of the financial system to adverse shocks and to prevent a repetition of 
the recent crisis.   
While the euro area banking system was fundamentally solvent, according to several 
stress tests (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011; European Banking Authority 
2012), the contagion from the Lehman bankruptcy put at risk the stability of the European 
financial system, indicating that systemic risk has been enormously underestimated (Bartram 
et al. 2007; Engle et al. 2014). Synchronically, as contagion fears spread, the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis became apparent, and threatened the integrity of the Eurozone (Lane 
2012; Claeys and Vašíček 2014). Emphatically, a sovereign default could lead to a disastrous 
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financial instability and to an unprecedented failure of the European banking system (see also 
Caballero and Simsek 2013; Gennaioli et al. 2014). 
The intensity and the speed with which shocks propagate in the entire financial 
system, highlights the need to identify, measure and understand the nature and the source of 
systemic risk in order to improve the underlying risks that banks face, to avert banks’ 
liquidation ex ante and to promote macro-prudential policy tools (for an extensive review on 
macro-prudential policies see also Hanson et al. 2011). Thus, this study focuses on the euro 
area banking industry to examine the way systemic risk arises endogenously, the resilience of 
the Euro area banking system to systemic risk, and how shocks in economic and financial 
channels propagate in the banking sector. We also endeavour to answer the following 
questions: In the presence of a distress situation how the financial system performs? Have the 
new capital rules rendered the European banking industry safer? What is the primary source 
of systemic risk? How financial contagion propagates within the Eurozone? These 
fundamental themes remain unanswered, and hence obtaining the answers is critical and at 
the heart of most of the recent research on systemic risk.
Motivated by the absence of empirical evidence, we address these issues drawing on 
recent developments in the studies of systemic risk, contagion channels and advances in 
network theory, by constructing a unique interconnected, dynamic and continuous-time 
model of financial networks with complete market structure1 (i.e. interbank loan market) and 
two additional independent channels of systemic risk (i.e. sovereign credit risk and asset price 
risk2). More precisely, we build on and extend the financial network models developed by 
Gai et al. (2011), Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan (2014) to employ counterfactual 
1 As discussed in the theoretical work of Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas et al. (2000) the interbank market 
follows a multilateral pattern of banks’ financial linkages - claims, the so called “complete market structure”.
2 In this study, asset price risk refers to the risk of depreciating a common asset which is financed by a loan (i.e. 
asset-backed loan). 
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simulations with entropy maximisation and to propagate shocks across the financial network3, 
emerged from three systemic risk channels. Thus, our methodological approach provides two 
novelties. First, the financial network in this study consists of a unique set of various sectors 
which are neglected hitherto by the international literature. Specifically, we analyse the 
complexity of the system in terms of not only the bilateral linkages but also losses and 
cascades of defaults triggered by sovereign credit risk, and asset price risk. Second, in 
contrast with the existing literature, we are able to disentangle the effects of the shock in 
losses generated by the initial shock and losses spread by contagion. More concretely, we are 
able to capture multiple snapshots of the network structure and to measure accurately the 
direct and indirect effects. Consequently, the model allows us to provide novel evidence on 
the type of systemic risk which dominates the financial system and to measure and evaluate: 
i) the effects of shocks on one or more financial institutions (e.g. total losses, solvency and 
bankruptcy events); ii) the transmission mechanism which transfers and provokes the 
negative effects to the rest of the system; and iii) the variations in financial robustness, which 
display the boundaries of the European banking system.  
Interestingly, at first glance we find that a shock in the interbank loan market causes 
the higher amount of losses in the banking network. This notwithstanding, remarkably we 
find that losses generated by the sovereign credit risk channel transmit faster through the 
contagion channel, triggering a cascade of bank failures. This shock can cause banks to stop 
using the interbank market to trade with each other and can also lead banks to liquidate their 
asset holdings in order to meet their short-term funding demands. Hence, the study provides 
empirical evidence that the Sovereign Credit Risk channel dominates systemic risks 
amplified in the euro area banking systems and hence, it is the primary source of systemic 
3 Our financial network uses the claims and liabilities of banks’ balance sheets and excludes any leverage, in 
order to secure that any variation in the system is based on multiple equilibria. Shocks propagated in our model 
would penalize banks for being exposed to leverage and increase substantially their vulnerability in systemic 
risk and contagion. This approach also fulfils the criteria of Allen and Gale (2000), Shin (2008), Mistrulli (2011) 
and Castren and Rancan (2014).
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risk. Moreover, we evaluate the impact of reduced collateral values and provide novel 
evidence that asset price contagion can also trigger severe direct losses and defaults in the 
banking system.  
In addition to the above, we provide novel evidence that systemic risk in the euro area 
banking system didn’t meaningfully decrease as it is evident that shocks in the three 
independent channels -interbank market, sovereign credit risk, asset price risk- trigger 
domino effects in the banking system. Likewise, we document a dramatic variation between 
northern and southern euro area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. More 
concretely, there is much less systemic risk and the speed of contagion is much lower in 
banks based in the northern euro area than in banks based in the southern euro area. 
Furthermore, we find that the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the 
size and the degree of exposure of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. 
Particularly, the more exposed domestic banks are to the foreign banking systems, the greater 
are the systemic risks and the spillover effects from foreign financial shocks to the domestic 
banking sector. Finally, the results imply that the European banking industry amid the post-
crisis deleverage, recapitalisation and the new regulatory rules, continues to be markedly 
vulnerable and conducive to systemic risks and financial contagion.  
The study contributes and extends three strands of the literature. First, there is a 
recently growing literature on the construction of financial networks with mathematical 
models. Kroszner (2007), and Allen and Carletti (2013), document that the size of the 
financial network plays an important role on the propagation of systemic risk. We update 
their work and offer novel evidence that there are marked differences in the dynamic 
responses to systemic-risk related events across national banking systems, indicating that the 
network structure is time-variant. Allen et al. (2011) observe that full risk diversification is 
not optimal in the banking industry, while Battiston et al. (2012) find that the financial 
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system can be more resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification. In a similar vein, 
we document that even domestic banks with small financial exposures in a foreign banking 
sector may be severely affected by a systemic shock provoked by same.  
Second, our study offers new insights on the critical role of endogenous complexity, 
betweenness, closeness and the importance of interconnectedness in the banking network. 
Leitner (2005), Gai et al. (2011), Billio et al. (2012), Castren and Rancan (2014), and Elliott 
et al. (2014) develop network models on monotonicity and identify the importance of 
complexity and concentration in the financial system. We extend their work demonstrating 
that the same shock would cause different losses in the banking network if emerged at 
different points in time. Importantly, we find that the propagated and the final losses differ 
substantially across the national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size, and 
the degree of interconnectedness across national banking systems. More concretely, the final 
losses appear to be lower in the post-crisis era, which may be due to cyclicality (i.e. 
deleverage, recapitalisation, new regulatory framework), but the risk of contagion remains 
substantially immense. Furthermore, we shed light on the debate for the suitability of the 
maximum entropy method on financial networks (Mistrulli 2011). Precisely, we employ 
several robustness checks by using the actual bilateral exposures in the four largest financial 
systems (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and compare the results with those obtained via 
the Maximum Entropy approach. On the empirical level, the findings indicate that Entropy 
Maximization neither over- nor under-estimates the bilateral exposures, while also this 
method is an appealing approach to calibrate losses generated by systemic shocks, and to 
measure the severity of financial contagion.  
Third, our study relates to the vast literature on macro-prudential policies, the nature 
of systemic risk, and the spread of contagion in the banking industry developed by Allen and 
Gale (2004), Allen et al. (2009), Co-Pierre (2013), Drehmann and Tarashev (2013), Ang and 
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Longstaff (2013), among others. For instance, Allen and Gale (2004), and Allen et al. (2009) 
examine how shocks propagate through a financial network, based on interbank lending and 
model excessive price volatility. Co-Pierre (2013) compares systemic risk caused by 
contagion with the risk triggered by common shocks whilst Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) 
measure the systemic importance of interconnected banks. Ang and Longstaff (2013) study 
the nature of systemic sovereign credit risk and observe that it is strongly related to financial 
market variables.  
To our knowledge this is the first study to explicitly compare different sources of 
systemic risk in the euro area banking industry. We provide novel evidence for the effects a 
negative shock generates by three independent systemic risk channels and document that 
contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. The results enlighten the nature of 
systemic risk and provide a new perspective on financial contagion and domino effects in the 
banking sector. We also show that the sovereign credit risk channel is the dominant systemic 
risk and causes a plethora of defaults in the banking system. Importantly, we observe that a 
repetition of the recent financial crisis is apparent in the euro area banking system, implying 
that existing developments on macro-prudential policies fail to mitigate meaningfully the 
degree of systemic risk in the banking industry. In a similar vein, our results shed new light 
on the asset and liability management of banks. Specifically, the three systemic risk channels 
facilitate and improve the understanding of how systemic risk arises, thus providing with the 
optimal structure of both assets and liabilities, rendering the banking industry more resilient 
to systemic risk. Finally, these results have important implications for understanding systemic 
risk and for analysing policies designed to mitigate financial contagion in the euro area. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. 
Section 3 describes the dataset, the methodology and the structure of the financial network. 
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Section 4 analyses the results from the simulation of the shock propagation. Section 5 
presents robustness checks and section 6 provides the concluding remark. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The global financial crisis of 2008 rendered systemic risk an area of escalated interest 
for researchers, whilst synchronically financial networks emerged as an appealing approach 
to study the way systemic risk propagates (see for example Elliott et al. 2014; Acemoglu et 
al. 2015). Hence, over the last years, studies on credit panics and bank runs departed from the 
traditional risk diversification framework (James 1991) and examined extreme 
interconnectedness (Ongena and Smith 2000; Caballero and Simsek 2013 inter alia) and 
ways to improve the stability of the financial system during turmoil periods (Gorton and 
Huang 2004 and 2006; Diamond and Rajan 2005), through financial interrelationships. A 
network describes a collection of nodes and the links between them, and thus, by using a 
network representation the structure of linkages among financial institutions (i.e. nodes) can 
be modelled and measured. Financial network theory can be instrumental in capturing risk 
associated externalities, triggered by a financial institution and the corresponding effects for 
the entire financial system. Thus, financial networks are employed as a suitable approach to 
study systemic risk, the way the banking system responds to contagion and to promote 
macro-prudential policies by examining network interdependencies.  
Importantly, the financial network framework exhibits that excessive 
interconnectedness among banks and financial institutions increases systemic risk4 and may 
lead to a plethora of bank failures and defaults (see also for informative reading Bae et al. 
4According to the Bank for International Settlements (1994) systemic risk is the risk that the failure of a 
participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain 
reaction leading to broader difficulties. 
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2003; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008; Brunnermeier 2008 inter alia). The recent financial 
turmoil have made clear that there is a strong need for sound empirical work in this area, in 
order to enhance regulations that prevent a local crisis from becoming global, and to examine 
vulnerabilities that emerge from network interdependencies in the financial system. However, 
due to limited availability of data, empirical applications are hitherto at an early stage. Thus, 
entropy maximisation which calibrates systemic risk in the network structure has only 
recently served as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures (Furfine 2003; 
Anand et al. 2014). 
2.2 Systemic risk and financial networks 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 and 2002), and Kaminski and Reinhart (1999) are among 
the first to search for systemic risk in banks, prompted by changes in macroeconomic 
developments. Allen and Gale (2000) employ a theoretical approach with banks’ bilateral 
exposures in a financial network framework, to examine how the banking system responds to 
contagion. They build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where consumers have random 
liquidity preferences, and they find that incomplete networks are more susceptible to 
contagion. Interestingly, Dasgupta (2005) examines how linkages among banks can be a 
source of contagious breakdowns, and finds the way depositors react when they receive a 
negative signal about banks’ fundamentals. 
On the search for optimal financial network the size of each national banking sector 
play a dominant role. Freixas et al. (2000) use interbank credit lines to explore liquidity 
shocks emerged from uncertainty about where consumers will withdraw funds. They find that 
the stability of the banking system depends emphatically on whether depositors choose to 
consume at the location of a bank that functions as a money center or not. Allen et al. (2009), 
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), and Allen et al. (2011), use bilateral exposures in the 
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interbank market to observe that a strongly connected banking network mitigates systemic 
risk by transferring the proportion of losses from one bank’s portfolio to more banks through 
interbank arrangements. In a similar vein, Cocco et al. (2009), documents that interbank 
networks are typically sparse, because interbank activity is based on relationships, while 
Craig and von Peter (2014) identify that smaller banks use a limited set of money center 
banks as intermediaries. 
An additional critical factor for the resilience of the banking network is the degree of 
interconnectedness. Allen and Gale (2004), Leitner (2005), Allen and Carletti (2006) and Gai 
and Kappadia (2010) find that banking systems respond differently in systemic risk due to 
changes on the degree of interconnectedness, idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks in 
the interbank market. In their theoretical approach, these studies account for the nature and 
scale bank-specific shocks, while also allowing asset prices to interact with balance sheets. 
Therefore, they propose central bank interventions to fix the short term interest rate and to 
provide extra liquidity in the market. Mistrulli (2011), and Trapp and Wewel (2013), observe 
not only that the network structures respond differently to the propagation of a shock, but the 
fragility of the system depends on the location in the network of the institution that was 
initially affected. Additionally, the first author simulates specific liquidity shocks in the 
Italian interbank market and observes that a bank default may spread to other banks through 
interbank linkages. 
Several studies build on the network structure proposed by Upper and Worms (2004), 
to propagate shocks within the interbank loan market. Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2011), 
and Hataj and Kok (2013) employ the epidemiology approach to test the resilience of the 
banking industry to systemic risk. Particularly, they construct dynamic banking networks to 
investigate how the likelihood of the market risk depends on the market conditions and the 
structure of the banking network. They document the key role of banks’ financial linkages 
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and observe that the spread of contagion depends on the degree of interconnection among 
banks. Furthermore, they find that contagion propagates within the financial network by 
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. 
The network theory links balance sheets’ claims and obligations into a network 
structure. This form allows researchers to model contagion risk and bank failures triggered by 
the propagation. Similarly, Castren and Rancan (2014) undertake an entropy maximization 
approach on macroeconomic data and bilateral exposures in the interbank market, to identify 
that the effects of systemic shocks depend on the underlying network structure. More 
recently, Elliot et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) explode how a propagation of shocks 
in banking networks and the extent of interbank connectivity increase systemic failures due to 
contagion of counterparty risk.  
It is evident from the existing literature that sovereign credit risk and asset price risk 
are not examined as two important sources of systemic risk. On the contrary, freezes in the 
interbank market dominate the way researchers explore financial contagion in the banking 
sector. Departing from the financial network approach, Duffie and Singleton (1999), and Ang 
and Longstaff (2013) use the sovereign credit risk channel to propagate sovereign – specific 
credit shocks and observe that it causes a cascade of defaults in U.S. and Eurozone 
sovereigns. Additionally, Longstaff (2010), and Garratt et al. (2014), study the relationship 
between reduced collateral values and asset price contagion. They identify that defaults in the 
subprime market spread quickly through the global financial system and provide evidence for 
the critical role of asset backed securities on the transmission of the financial crisis. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
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We collect our dataset on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 2005 till the fourth 
quarter of 2013 for sixteen Eurozone countries5. We obtain it from three sources: the Bank 
for International Settlements for the cross border quarterly exposures in the interbank market, 
the total banking exposures to each foreign country and the actual exposures in Sovereign 
Debt and asset-backed loans. For instance, we have information for the exposure of Austrian 
banks not just in French Sovereign debt, and asset-backed loans to companies based in 
France, but also for loans in French banks via the interbank market.  Also, we collect data 
from the European Central Banks’ sectoral balance sheets (flow of funds) for the local 
bilateral banking exposures.  Finally, we obtain data from Bankscope on Tier 1 capital and 
Total Assets for 170 Eurozone based banks (see also Appendix A for more details). 
3.2 The Network Structure 
The study explores the consequences from a propagation of shocks in the banking 
network in two steps. First, we construct the financial network based on the banks’ actual 
exposures in the interbank loan market, the sovereign debt (i.e. sovereign credit risk) and 
asset backed loans (i.e. asset price risk). We then propagate endogenous shocks commenced 
by the three channels described previously and measure the effects (i.e. losses) in the banking 
system. The losses are distributed into two components: the losses incurred by the initial 
shock and the losses resulting from the contagion process in order to measure the speed of the 
contagion. 
The structure of the network is constructed by bank balance sheet interconnections 
(nodes in the interbank network), actual bilateral exposures and banks’ exposures to 
sovereign debt and asset backed loans. For any missing information in the interbank bilateral 
exposures, we employ the entropy maximisation method with the complementary use of the 
5 Our sample consists of the following euro area countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), and Spain (ES). 
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RAS algorithm which provides the advantage of minimizing any lost information in the 
priors. In particular, the financial network is generated based on the following three steps: 
First, we consider a Eurozone based economy with n financial intermediaries (i.e. banks). 
These are initially linked with each other based on the actual and simulated exposures in the 
local interbank market, and thus create a two-way interrelationship which is important for the 
spread of shocks within the network and for the analysis of the contagion path. Particularly, a 
bank is allowed to lend money to another bank and simultaneously the same bank may 
borrow money from a third bank. Using this structure for our network, we achieve to measure 
the potential benefits of diversification and to distinguish between losses incurred by risk 
sharing and losses incurred by risk spreading through the financial network. Consequently, 
we have the first systemic risk channel - “local interbank loan market”- represented in Figure 
1, also called a “node” in the network structure (see also Newman 2002; and Gai et al. 2011 
for informative reading on network structures). 
-Please Insert Figure 1 about here- 
Then, we create two additional systemic risk sources (or nodes) the “sovereign credit 
risk”, and the “asset price risk” channels. The first contains banks’ actual exposures in 
Sovereign Debt, and the second deals with banks’ actual exposures in asset-backed loans. 
Our sample contains 16 countries, and thus corresponds to 48 nodes. Finally, we use the 
cross-border exposures to link and interconnect every local banking system (see also Figure 
2).   
-Please Insert Figure 2 about here–
As a result, we model the direct and the indirect effects from a systemic shock. For 
instance, assume that there is a bank based in country θ with interlinkages with a bank based 
in country ψ. During severe financial conditions, the bank in one country will be affected by 
the shock to a bank in another country. Moreover, the effects of the shock can also be spread 
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via banks in a third banking system. Thus, the interdependence in the banking system over 
the network indicates that when a bank is under distress situation, may provoke a plethora of 
collapses throughout the financial network (see also Appendix B for the contagion path). 
Thus, similar to Shin (2008) and Castren and Rancan (2014) we construct an accounting 
framework of the financial system as a network of interlinked balance sheets where one 
sector’s assets are another’s liabilities.
3.3 Estimation  
Since, we have different types of nodes, our financial network is defined as 
heterogenous. In order to estimate bank-to-bank exposures in the financial network, we 
employ the maximum entropy approach, which assumes that banks spread their lending as 
evenly as possible. Following Castren and Rancan (2014), two nodes and  are connected 
through edges, labelled with , where: 
, when there is a relationship; and 
, when there is no relationship. 
Similarly, the link which connects two nodes is defined as xij. The links are directed, so that 
 is not symmetric (i.e. xij ≠ xji). The strength of the link depends on the size and the degree 
of interconnection. In Appendix C we analyse the positions (i.e. degree, weight, centrality, 
betweenness, closeness) of the individual nodes in relation to the overall network, and 
provide the analytical structure of the financial network.  
The bankings’ sectors financial exposures to each other can be represented by an 
matrix  where each element  is a bilateral exposure from sector  to sector . This implies 
that an element  is an asset of sector viz-a-viz sector  and naturally is also a liability of 
sector  towards sector .   
15 
11 1 1 1
1
1
1
... ...j N
i ij iN i
N Nj NN N
j N
x x x a
x x x a
X
x x x a
l ll
           
       (1) 
Thus a sector’s total assets are given by the sum of its row, the marginal  above 
given by formula (2) below:  
(2) 
By the same rationale a sector’s total liabilities are given by the marginal as in 
formula (3) below: 
(3) 
We do not have information for the element  but we do have the column and row 
marginal from the euro area accounts collected from the European Central Bank. From these 
we want to extract a set of  consistent with the row and column totals and also a set that is 
the most possible, given the values of the vectors  and . However, without any further 
assumptions about  we cannot estimate the result analytically for N>2 since N2 – 2N 
unknowns have to be estimated.  If we make a further assumption that the data are 
consolidated, that is a sector does not borrow or lend to itself, the main diagonal (  for
) becomes zero and we can interpret the ’s and ’s as realisations of the marginal 
distributions  and f( ), and the x’s as their joint distribution, . If  and f( ) 
are independent, then  . According to the information theory (Jaynes, 1957), this 
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gives us the matrix . Now we have  unknowns and the problem cannot be 
estimated analytically for . 
1 1 1
1*
1
1
0 ... ...
0
0
j N
i iN i
N Nj N
j N
x x a
x x a
X
x x a
l ll
           
        (4) 
Standardising we can interpret the vectors  and  as the marginal distributions 
  and  while the ’s are their joint distribution . Then if  and 
are independent it follows that (see also Upper and Worms 2004 for further 
reading). In information theory terms, this amounts to maximising the entropy of the matrix 
. This independence assumption is consistent with each sector’s assets and liabilities being 
spread equally over the other sectors based on their total assets and liabilities.  
Of course independence is not always a good predictor of reality. There could be 
economic or political reasons why some sectors in some countries might be more exposed to 
some others. However by constructing the network of exposures with the independence 
assumption we are biasing it against contagion which would be more likely to manifest if 
some sectors were over-exposed to another infected sector. Thus if we observe significant 
contagion effects in our model we are more likely to view them in reality.  
In order to solve for the ’s we have to minimise the cross entropy of  with 
respect to a matrix with elements  for  and  for . 
such that and (5) 
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where  refers to a Hadamard (element-wise) division; and are  vectors that are 
obtained by column-stacking the off-diagonal elements of matrices and  , such that all 
elements of are strictly greater than zero; is a  selection matrix, 
containing zeros and ones;  is an dimensional column vector that row sums of the 
matrix , and  is an dimensional row vector that contains column sums of matrix . 
Because the objective function is strictly concave, we will get unique solution by solving (5) 
iteratively via using the RAS algorithm.  
The RAS is an Iterative Proportional Fitting algorithm which adjusts an initial matrix 
X with row sums  and column sums  to a new matrix  that satisfies a new set of given 
row sums  and such that , where and are diagonal matrices with positive 
entries on the main diagonal. We employ it in order to achieve consistency derived from any 
missing or incomplete information between the entries in our matrix and the pre-specified 
row and column totals. Specifically, we have no information for actual bilateral exposures in 
the interbank loan market for some countries, and hence the actual linages are created 
through the RAS algorithm to guide us to a desired direction by excluding non-existent links. 
As a result, by using RAS round-by-round according to the sizes of the balance sheet linkages 
we reach a matrix where column sums and row sums are equal. Notably, the adjustments of 
the entries of the matrix are kept as close as possible to their initial values (i.e. bi-
proportional), in order to preserve the structure of the matrix as much as possible. Hence, in 
order to estimate the bilateral exposures with the use of RAS in the new matrix X*, we 
minimise the cross-entropy between the matrix X* and the matrix X in equation, so that 
interbank exposures are as close as possible between the two matrices: 
         (6) 
s.t.  and 
for:  and also: 
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4. Empirical Findings 
We simulate quarter-by-quarter three negative shocks emerged from: i) the Sovereign 
Credit Risk channel (or SCR), ii) the Interbank loan channel (or IB), and iii) the Asset Loan 
channel (or AL). We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each 
bank has to deduct losses triggered by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. 
Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply a deduction in the banking sector’s 
assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital inevitable. We set a 
10% shock derived from each channel and in the first step we measure the local (national) 
magnitude of the shocks. In our analysis, we are interested in examining losses and the 
contagion path occurred by the shock propagation, and thus we do not model any government 
or central bank interventions which require exogenous responses and might follow different 
rules. For instance, governments may decide to bail-out troubled banks, to force mergers 
between distress and healthy banks or to provide liquidity and funding through an asset 
purchase program with the intervention of central banks.  
We then proceed on to measure the spread of the shock originated from the banks’ 
domestic exposures, the banking systems most affected by the various shocks and hence the 
expected losses caused by the spread of the shocks across the euro area banking network. 
Hence, similar to Furfine (2003), Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Gai et al. (2011) our measure 
of systemic risk is the expected loss that the contagion channel imposes on a banking system. 
Finally, by assuming that banks cannot raise capital to compensate for the losses suffered 
from the shocks, we examine the resilience of the euro area banking sector, the way financial 
contagion propagates in the cross-border financial network, the speed of contagion and the 
ability of a local banking system to transmit cross-border systemic risks.    
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4.1 Shocks in the national banking systems  
The sovereign credit risk channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of 
government bonds decreases by 10%. This shock is then propagated through the local 
banking network. Consequently, we exhibit to measure the interplay of financial 
interdependence among national banks and the financial acceleration in the development of 
systemic risk. Table 1 displays the impact (i.e. final losses) of a 10% shock over discrete 
periods of time, separately for each national banking sector. Notably, the impact of the shock 
is time-variant and also, changes widely across the national banking systems. This may be 
due to cyclicality (i.e. post-crisis deleverage process, recapitalisation, new regulatory 
framework), or the difference on the size and the banking structure of each economy. For 
instance, a 10% shock (i.e. decline in the price) to the Austrian Government Bonds causes 
€3.37 bn. losses to the Austrian banking sector, during the pre-crisis period. The losses 
increase during the crisis period (€4.08 bn.) and decrease in the post-crisis period (€ 3.33 
bn.). This pattern characterises all national banking systems within our sample, implying that 
in the post-crisis era, banks reduced their exposures in sovereign debt holdings. Interestingly, 
in northern euro area countries, the majority of the losses are registered in the German 
banking system, while for southern euro area countries they are apparent in the French 
banking system. This is not entirely surprising given the size of banking sectors in these 
countries.  
Figure 3 depicts the expected losses caused over time from a shock in the German and 
French sovereign debt accordingly. The results also indicate that a shock in the SCR channel 
triggers higher losses in the southern euro area, possibly due to the magnitude and the size of 
the Italian and Spanish sovereign debts (please see also Figure 4). It is worth noting that an 
intervention from a central bank could be at any point when the losses are propagated and can be 
through many ways. For instance, German banks can use their capital buffers to control a 
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proportion of the losses. In this case the central bank will need to intervene with €3bn. in 
order to absorb the losses propagated by the shock in the German network. Similarly, a 
central bank intervention for the French banking system would cost €4.8 bn. for the post-
crisis period. 
-Please Insert Table 1 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here- 
The interbank lending channel simulates a scenario wherein 10% of the total value of 
interbank loans will not be paid back. This shock is then propagated through the national 
banking networks. At first glance, Table 2 shows that expected losses triggered by the shock 
on interbank loans for the local banks exceed the expected losses driven by the SCR channel, 
implying that the interbank lending channel (IB) is systematically more important for the 
banking industry. Notably, the total expected losses decrease in the post-crisis period, as a 
result of the ensuing process of bank deleveraging. Furthermore, the final losses vary 
substantially across national banking systems reflecting the differences on the size of each 
interbank market. Figure 5 summarises the expected losses registered for the French (€ 63.57 
bn. in the post-crisis era) and the German (€35.04 bn. in the post-crisis era) banking systems. 
Notably, a central bank intervention will cost €30.5bn. for the French and €12bn. for the 
German banking networks respectively, for the post-crisis period. Similar to the results 
obtained from the shock in the sovereign debt market, the Italian (€23.24 bn.) and the Spanish 
(€22.56 bn.) banking sectors are affected the most compared with the rest of the countries 
incorporated in our sample (see also Figure 6).  
-Please Insert Table 2 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here- 
Furthermore, Table 3 presents the expected losses after the propagation of a shock in 
the Asset Loan channel (AL), independently for each national banking system. More 
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concretely, the asset loan channel simulates a scenario wherein the value of the collateral of 
the asset-backed loans declines by 10%. The expected losses propagated through the AL 
channel exceed the losses propagated by the SCR channel, but are lower than the losses 
propagated by the IB channel. For instance, the total amount of losses for France is €40.22 
bn. in the post-crisis era and for Germany is €27.24 bn. (sees also Figure 7). Consequently, 
the results demonstrate that total expected losses decline in the post crisis era, confirming that 
banks reduced their exposure to asset-backed loans. Interestingly, a central bank intervention 
will cost €27bn. for the French and €3bn. for the German banking networks respectively. 
Figure 8 depicts that the same relationship holds for the effects of a shock in the Asset Loan 
channel for the Italian and the Spanish banking systems. Additionally, we find that each 
national banking system responds differently to systemic-risk related events (see also Figure 
9). Particularly, the smaller is the banking sector, the lesser are the expected losses. From the 
three systemic risk channels, the interbank loan market constitutes the most important source 
of losses to the euro area banks. Moreover, we find that the same shock would cause different 
losses in the national banking sectors if emerged at different points in time. Interestingly, the 
results imply that euro area banks have strengthened their capital positions in the post-crisis 
era amid ongoing deleveraging. 
-Please Insert Table 3 about here- 
-Please Insert Figures 7, 8 and 9 about here- 
4.2 Propagation of Shocks in the cross-border financial network 
 Next, we quantify the effects of shocks in the cross-border financial network, in order 
to examine the extent to which local banking systems transmit the losses to the European 
banking sector. Particularly, we examine how a national shock propagates and spreads within 
the euro are banking network. Table 4 depicts total losses in the banking systems from a 10% 
shock in the three systemic risk channels of Germany (Panel A) and France (Panel B), the 
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two largest economies in the euro area. Interestingly, the results imply that the interbank 
market causes the higher expected losses when compared with the Sovereign Credit Risk and 
the Asset Loan channels. Additionally, the final losses vary substantially across the banking 
systems. Specifically, French banks suffer the wider losses due the size of its banking sector 
and due to large interconnectedness with the German financial system. Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that a 10% shock in the German systemic risk channels generates higher losses 
for the euro area banking sectors compared with a similar shock in the French channels. 
Thus, the German banking system is identified as systematically more important than the 
French banking system. The differences in the final losses are explained by the large 
differences on the size of the national banking sectors and on the degree of 
interconnectedness.  
-Please Insert Table 4 Panel A and B about here- 
Accordingly, the results in Table 5 suggest that a shock in the Italian economic 
system (Panel A) triggers wider losses in the euro area banking sector compared with a shock 
in the Spanish financial system (Panel B). Hence, the Italian financial system is 
systematically more important than the Spanish banking system for the euro area. The results 
indicate that a shock emerging from a given banking sector does not have the same impact 
than a shock propagating from some other banking sector. Furthermore, the results 
demonstrate that each of the systemic risk channels has a different impact on every local 
banking system and that the interbank risk channel generates the wider losses in the euro area 
banking network. 
-Please Insert Table 5 Panel A and B about here- 
Interestingly, a shock in a smaller banking system, like the Greek and the Portuguese 
(Table 6), originate a small amount of losses in the euro area banking systems. This can be 
explained to a great extent by the small size of their banking sectors and hence the small 
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degree of interconnectedness with other European banking sectors. Consequently, we observe 
that the cross-border transmission of systemic shocks depends on the size and the degree of 
exposure of the banking sector in a foreign financial system. This result is in line with 
Kamber and Theonissen (2013) who observe that the more exposed domestic banks are to the 
foreign economy, the greater are the spillovers from foreign financial shocks to the home 
economy. As a result, each local banking system develops different propagation dynamics in 
the banking network, due to the differences in the financial structure (i.e. different magnitude 
of bilateral exposures and different size of sovereign debt and asset backed loans). Finally, 
we observe that final losses are time-variant, since the same shock propagated at different 
points in time diverse results6. This can be explained by the changes in the network structure 
triggered by changes in the degree of interconnectedness in the euro area banking sectors.  
-Please Insert Table 6 about here- 
4.3 The path and speed of contagion within the European banking network
 In this section we analyse how systemic shocks originated in a national banking 
system, spread in the euro area banking network resembling to financial contagion. In 
particular, by using 170 banks from 16 euro area countries, we measure the speed and the 
path of cross-country financial contagion within the Eurozone. The simulation test is for a 
10% propagation of shocks7 in the three independent contagion channels, a scenario which is 
reasonable under severe financial conditions. Consequently, this approach allows us to 
capture the effect of variations in financial robustness from one bank to the others, rather than 
focusing exclusively on default events and bankruptcies.  
Table 7 presents the results for a shock in the SCR channel and shows: i) the number 
of banks that default due to the shock and ii) the number of banks whose default cause at least 
one bank failure by contagion. The evidence indicates that financial contagion is highly 
6 More results for the pre and post-crisis effects on banks’ losses are available upon request by the authors.
7 Additional results with different scenarios are available upon request by the authors. 
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possible to occur in the euro area banking system.  Moreover, we observe that the spread of 
the shock depends on the size of the bank that fails at the initial stage. More precisely, shocks 
in the German and French banking systems cause the wider failures. This can be explained by 
the size of their national banking sectors and from the large number of small banks which 
creates a cascade of defaults due to their interconnectedness. Thus, interestingly we find that 
contagious banks are not necessarily the large ones. This result is in line with Mistrulli 
(2011). Notably, there exists a certain threshold (30%) for the loss rate at which the shock 
spreads across the whole euro area banking industry, thus affecting all banks through 
contagion. 
-Please Insert Table 7 about here- 
Table 8 depicts the effects from a 10% shock that propagates through the Asset Loan 
channel. The results imply that the defaulted banks are lessen indicating that the SCR is the 
dominant systemic risk channel and the most systematically important for the spread of 
contagion in the euro area banking systems. 
-Please Insert Table8 about here- 
Table 9 shows the effects from a 10% shock in the Interbank lending channel (IB). 
The results demonstrate that the number of defaulted banks is higher when compared with the 
AL channel, but less than the number of banks that fail due to a shock in the SCR channel. 
Thus, a closer look at the contagion path reveals that the SCR channel is the most 
systematically important source to spread contagion within the euro area financial network. 
-Please Insert Table 9 about here- 
The findings presented in this section, demonstrate vividly that the change in the 
financial stability of a bank is affected at any point in time by the financial stability of the 
counterparties. Additionally, the results imply that if some banks default, this can trigger a 
cascade of defaults resembling to financial contagion. Consequently, the default of a bank 
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decreases the value of the assets of each bank in the financial network down to the point 
where the value of assets becomes smaller than the value of liabilities. Thus, the bank 
defaults and spreads the crisis to other interconnected banks. These results complement the 
work of Gai et al. (2011) who observe that when risk sharing is maximised among 
counterparties, the default threshold hold the critical role for the spread of the shock. 
 Table 10 presents the results on how a default within the domestic banking system 
propagates in an international financial network. The most systematically important country 
is Germany and thus, we focus on the effects caused by a 10% shock in their interbank 
market8. The results obtained are based on the assumption that banks cannot react to the 
shock by raising capital while also governments and central banks cannot intervene at any 
stage. Indeed, whilst liquidity abruptly dries up when the financial system is under a distress 
situation, (see also Longstaff, 2010), central banks and governments need a sufficient amount 
of time to decide on the appropriate actions. 
Notably, we observe that a shock generated in the German banking network may 
cause severe losses and defaults in the euro area banking system. Also, we find that a bank in 
a foreign country may not be financially linked with German banks, but it is possible to suffer 
from losses or even defaults to its banking sector due to financial contagion. This result is 
driven by the systemic importance of the German banking sector which lends to the 
periphery, and thus makes contagion effects more apparent. Moreover, the degree of losses 
varies substantially across national banking systems depending on the size and the degree of 
their interconnectedness. Thus, the speed at which losses are absorbed by the banking 
networks varies across countries. Consequently, we document that the spread of a shock 
depends on the systemic importance of a banking system, and the impact of a shock of a 
given magnitude strongly depends on its initial location. Thus, the probability of default does 
8 Results for the cross-border contagion path for all other euro area countries are available upon request by the 
authors.  
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not decrease monotonically with diversification in the interbank loan market, a result which 
corroborates the work of Allen et al. (2011). Interestingly, the propagation of a shock 
generated by other banking systems causes less contagious failures in the financial network, 
resembling to a non-monotonic connectivity of contagion, similar to Gai and Kapadia (2010). 
Albeit, we observe that even small banking systems (e.g. Greece and Portugal9) have the 
ability to transmit distress in stronger banking sectors. As a result, the smaller is the banking 
sector, the lesser are the expected losses and the cross-country contagion effects. These 
results are in line with the works of Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas et al. (2000) who find 
that complete markets are not necessarily less conductive to contagion than incomplete 
markets.  
In addition, from Table 10 we observe that there are marked differences in the 
dynamic responses across the national banking systems. Specifically, southern euro area 
banks react more strongly than northern euro area banks. This implies that southern euro area 
banks are more prone to financial contagion and more susceptible to systemic risks. 
Moreover, we find that as conditions deteriorate in the euro area banking system, the degree 
of interconnectedness in the financial network increases the possibility of a domino effect. 
Shocks generated in the German banking system create large losses in the financial network, 
and thus the domino effect is more apparent. This result corroborates and extends the 
theoretical work on endogenous complexity and the model of financial crises proposed by 
Cavallero and Simsek (2013). Finally, the propagation effects reveal that albeit the new 
regulatory framework and the deleveraging process, the risk of financial contagion has not 
substantially decreased.  
- Please Insert Table 10 about here- 
9 More results on the way small banking systems transmit the shocks in larger banking systems are available by 
the authors upon request.
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5. Robustness Check 
The main finding of our study is that by employing the Maximum Entropy approach 
we capture three systemic risk channels which transform risk in the euro area financial 
network. In order to check the sensitivity of our findings we use the actual bilateral exposures 
in the four largest banking systems (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) to compare the results 
with those obtained with Maximum Entropy. This comparison is important, since it sheds 
light on the reliability of the maximum entropy approach for assessing the interbank market 
vulnerability to financial contagion. Following Mistrulli (2011) and Castren and Rancan 
(2014), the comparison between Maximum Entropy and observed interbank patterns can be 
interpreted as the theoretical comparison proposed by Allen and Gale (2000) between 
complete and incomplete markets. 
 Figures 10 presents the results with the Maximum Entropy method and the results 
obtained with the actual bilateral exposures for the German and French banking networks. 
We observe that both (estimated and actual) lines are fairly closed to each other, implying 
that the Maximum Entropy approach neither over- nor under-estimates the bilateral 
exposures. Indeed, the black line which represents the Maximum Entropy approach10 of 
bilateral exposures produces very similar results with the actual exposures, implying that the 
Maximum Entropy approach is a suitable way to calibrate losses generated by systemic 
shocks.  
-Please Insert Figure 10 about here- 
Similar results are obtained for Figure 11 which depicts the Spanish and Italian 
banking systems. Specifically, the differences between the observed and the estimated values 
are fairly closed. Notably, the black line represents cross-country exposures in the interbank 
market, estimated with the use of RAS algorithm. On the other hand, the grey line represents 
10 The Maximum Entropy matrix of bilateral exposures contains the assumption that for each bank total 
interbank liabilities and total interbank assets are equal. 
28 
cross-country exposures in the interbank market, estimated with actual bilateral exposures 
with data constructed by the balance sheet items. 
-Please Insert Figure 11 about here- 
Moreover, we use the actual values to propagate shocks in the euro area interbank, 
sovereign and loan markets, and we observe that the estimated losses within the banking 
networks are quite similar to the estimated losses of the financial network computed with the 
Maximum Entropy approach11. In contrast to Mistrulli (2011) and in line with the work of 
Castren and Rancan (2014), this result asserts that the Maximum Entropy method does not 
underestimate the extent of the shock propagation.  
6. Conclusion 
This study models systemic risk by employing the Maximum Entropy approach for 
the euro area banking industry. We construct a unique interconnected, dynamic and 
continuous-time financial network and employ counterfactual simulations to propagate 
systemic shocks. In contrast to the existing literature, we use three independent channels of 
systemic risk: the interbank loan market, the sovereign credit risk market and the asset loan 
market, and provide novel evidence on the effects of shocks on financial institutions, the 
speed of contagion, the way shocks propagate and how euro area banks respond under severe 
financial conditions. 
In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the findings have important 
implications for understanding systemic risk and for analysing policies designed to mitigate 
financial contagion in the euro area. Specifically, at first glance the empirical results reveal 
that a shock in the interbank loan market triggers the highest expected losses in the banking 
systems. However, by modelling the contagion path the findings reveal that a shock in the 
sovereign credit risk channel transmits faster through the banking network and leads to a 
11 Additional results on robustness checks are available upon request by the authors. 
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cascade of defaults. Thus, we conclude that the sovereign credit risk channel dominates 
systemic risks amplified in the euro area financial network. Additionally, we document that 
the propagated losses vary across the national banking sectors depending on their sizes and 
interconnectiveness, while also there is a dramatic variation across northern and southern 
euro area countries in terms of their response to systemic risk. In particular, the speed of 
contagion and the expected bank failures are markedly more prominent in southern euro area 
banking systems. 
Moreover, by modelling the contagion path we observe that losses vary over time due 
to the post-crisis deleverage and to changes in the degree of interconnections among 
European banks. Interestingly, the findings reveal that the cross-border transmission of 
systemic shocks - and consequently the speed of contagion - depends on the size of the 
national banking sector, the initial location of the generated shock and the degree of 
interconnectedness. Finally, it is evident from the results that the European banking system 
remains highly vulnerable and conducive to financial contagion, implying that the new 
capital rules have not substantially reduced systemic risks, and hence, there is a need for 
additional policies in order to increase the resilience of the sector.  
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Appendix A. Eurozone Banks. 
The appendix below presents the sample of banks used in the study with quarterly data and 
the banks’ place of origin. Our focus is the propagation of shocks in the Interbank, Asset-
Backed Loan and Sovereign Credit Risk channels. Analytical information for the actual 
exposure of the banks is collected via the euro area Balance Sheet Items statistics. Notably, 
the propagation of shocks is employed for the largest banks (based on actual assets) in the 
euro area.  
Bank Country Bank Country
UniCredit Bank Austria AG-Bank Austria Austria Nordea Bank Finland Plc Finland
Steiermärkische Bank und Sparkassen AG-Bank Styria Austria Danske Bank Plc Finland
Raiffeisen Bausparkasse GmbH-Raiffeisen Wohn Bausparen Austria Aktia Bank Plc Finland
Landes-Hypothekenbank Tirol-Hypo Tirol Bank Austria OP Mortgage Bank Finland
Bausparkasse der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG Austria Helsinki OP Bank Plc Finland
Bausparkasse Wuestenrot Austria Société Générale France
Ageas Belgium BPCE Group France
AXA Bank Europe SA/NV Belgium BPCE SA France
BKCP scrl Belgium Credit Mutuel (Combined - IFRS) France
RHJ International SA Belgium Fédération du Crédit Mutuel France
Banque CPH Belgium Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel France
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC France
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppen (Combined)-Sparkassen Germany HSBC France France
DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank Germany La Banque Postale France
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thuringen Germany Crédit Foncier de France France
Deutsche Postbank AG Germany
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations-Groupe Caisse 
des Dépôts France
FMS Wertmanagement  Anstalt Des Oeffentlichen Recht Germany Credit Mutuel Arkea France
NRW.BANK Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Ile-de-France France
Deutsche Bank Privat-und Geschaftskunden AG Germany Crédit du Nord France
Wüstenrot & Württembergische Germany Crédit Mutuel Nord Europe France
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg - Förderbank-L-
Bank Germany Crédit Immobilier de France Développement - CIFD France
Bausparkasse Schwäbisch Hall AG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Rhône Alpes France
Hamburger Sparkasse AG (HASPA) Germany
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance Provence Alpes 
Corse SA France
HASPA Finanzholding Germany Lyonnaise de Banque France
Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland AG Germany
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance Bretagne-Pays de 
Loire France
Santander Consumer Bank AG Germany
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Nord France-
Europe France
BHW Bausparkasse AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Normandie France
Münchener Hypothekenbank eG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance de Midi-Pyrénées France
Deutsche Apotheker- und Aerztebank eG Germany Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance de Bourgogne France
Sachsen-Finanzgruppe Germany Crédit Coopératif France
SEB AG Germany Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Côte d'Azur France
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft) Germany
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance d'Auvergne et du 
Limousin France
Sparkasse KölnBonn Germany Crédit Mutuel Océan France
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany Banque Palatine France
Kreissparkasse Köln Germany Crédit Mutuel de Maine-Anjou et Basse-Normandie France
Wüstenrot Bausparkasse AG Germany Banque populaire Lorraine Champagne France
LFA Förderbank Bayern Germany Banque Populaire Aquitaine Centre Atlantique France
BMW Bank GmbH Germany Banque Populaire Val de France France
Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank AG Germany Banque Populaire des Alpes France
Frankfurter Sparkasse Germany
Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance du Languedoc 
Roussillon France
InvestitionsBank Schleswig-Holstein Germany Banque Européenne du Crédit Mutuel France
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Stadtsparkasse München Germany Casden Banque Populaire France
Wuestenrot Bank AG Pfandbriefbank Germany National Bank of Greece SA Greece
Sparkasse Hannover Germany Piraeus Bank SA Greece
Sparda-Bank Baden-Württemberg eG Germany Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece
Bayerische Landesbausparkasse LBS Germany Alpha Bank AE Greece
Stadtsparkasse Düsseldorf Germany
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank 
of Ireland Ireland
Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG Germany Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland
Targobank AG & Co KGaA Germany Permanent TSB Plc Ireland
Mittelbrandenburgische Sparkasse in Potsdam Germany Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank Ireland
Die Sparkasse Bremen Germany AIB Mortgage Bank Ireland
Nassauische Sparkasse Germany EBS Limited Ireland
LBS Landesbausparkasse Baden- Württemberg Germany ICS Building Society Ireland
Sparkasse Pforzheim Calw Germany Credito Emiliano Holding Italy
LBS Westdeutsche Landesbausparkasse Germany Casse del Tirreno Italy
InvestitionsBank des Landes Brandenburg Germany Bank Sepah Italy
Berliner Volksbank eG Germany Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A. Luxembourg
Kreissparkasse Ludwigsburg Germany Standard International Holdings S.A. Luxembourg
Kreissparkasse Muenchen Starnberg Ebersberg Germany KBL European Private Bankers SA Luxembourg
Sparkasse Nürnberg Germany Jsc Latvian Development Financial Institution Altum Latvia
Sparda-Bank Südwest eG Germany GE Capital Latvia Latvia
Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz (ISB) GmbH Germany Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal
Debeka Bausparkasse AG, Sitz Koblenz am Rhein Germany Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp Portugal
Deutsche Bank Bauspar AG Germany Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal
Sparkasse Leipzig Germany Banco BPI SA Portugal
Sparkasse Münsterland Ost Germany Santander Totta SGPS Portugal
Bank für Sozialwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft Germany Banco Santander Totta SA Portugal
Sparda-Bank West eG Germany Caixa Economica Montepio Geral Portugal
Landessparkasse zu Oldenburg Germany BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA Portugal
Frankfurter Volksbank eG Germany Banco Popular Portugal SA Portugal
Kreissparkasse Esslingen Nuertingen Germany Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. Slovakia
Sparkasse Krefeld Germany Tatra Banka a.s. Slovakia
Bethmann Bank Germany Sberbank Slovensko, as Slovakia
Saechsische AufbauBank Forderbank Germany Prima banka Slovensko a.s. Slovakia
Stadtsparkasse Essen-Sparkasse Essen Germany Banka Celje dd Slovakia
BBBank eG Germany Banka Koper d.d. Slovenia
LBS Norddeutsche Landesbausparkasse Berlin-Hannover Germany Banka Celje dd Slovenia
Sparkasse Dortmund Germany Gorenjska Banka d.d. Kranj Slovenia
DNB Pank AS Estonia Postna Banka Slovenije dd Slovenia
AS LHV Pank Estonia
Fund KredEx Estonia
Tallinn Business Bank Ltd-Tallinna Äripanga AS Estonia
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain
Ibercaja Banco SAU Spain
Catalunya Banc SA Spain
Kutxabank SA Spain
Liberbank SA Spain
Caja Laboral Popular Coop de credito Spain
Barclays Bank S.A. Spain
Banco Grupo Cajatres SA-Caja 3 Spain
Caja Rural De Castilla-La Mancha Spain
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Appendix B. Modelling Financial Contagion
We model contagion stemming from unexpected shocks in our financial network, 
with banks’ balance sheets12 being the conduits for the transmission of the shocks as losses 
propagate through the banking system. The simulations are employed quarter-by-quarter 
between the first quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2013. Specifically, we consider 
sixteen Eurozone based countries, each with an economic system formed by N banks. We 
consider a credit cycle which lasts for four dates (t = 0, 1, 2, 3). At the initial date (i.e. t = 0), 
each bank i holds sufficient capital that it can either lend it to other banks via the interbank 
loan channel ( ) and/or invest in Government Bonds ( ) via the Sovereign Credit Risk 
channel, and/or invest in asset-backed loans ( ) via the Asset Loan Risk channel. All 
projects described above, provide a sufficient profit if held to maturity, i.e. at t = 3. However, 
the bank has the choice to liquidate its project (fully or partially) at t = 2, but will only 
recover a fraction of the project’s full value. 
We propagate shocks triggered by each channel independently at time t  = 1. Then, we 
measure the losses realised for banks emanated from the shocks in each channel. Every bank 
has to meet interbank liabilities ( ) and thus, losses incurred by a shock in a channel (e.g. 
the asset loan risk channel ) can be recovered by liquidating other projects (e.g. the 
Sovereign Debt holdings  ), at time t = 2.  Consequently, systemic shocks in one channel 
may trigger fire sales, and hence losses in other channels. Thus, our approach allows us to 
distinguish between losses incurred by the propagation of a shock and losses incurred by 
contagion and the spread of systemic risk.  
As a result, if there is a shock in the interbank loan channel, a bank i is solvent when: 
12 We follow the mark-to-market accounting practices and assume that each bank has to deduct losses triggered 
by the shocks or to use the capital buffers when possible. Consequently, any losses imposed by the shocks imply 
a deduction in the banking sector’s assets, which apparently renders a corresponding loss in its equity capital 
inevitable.  
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CR (1)
where σ is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have suffered losses from the 
shock, is the resale price of the Sovereign Bond, is the resale price of the asset-backed 
loan, and CR is the bank’s tier-1 capital. Moreover, the values of and are always less 
than one in the event of asset sales, since there are fire sales with the propagation of the shock 
in order  a bank to meet its liabilities.
As a result, when , a bank has to liquidate other projects in order to be 
solvent: 
for . (2)
where is the bank’s capital buffer which can be used in order 
to meet its liabilities.  
All banks are allowed to fail one at a time, if the amount of the losses is greater than 
lenders’ reported tier-1 capital (i.e. capital + reserves). Finally, we calculate the losses 
triggered in other banking systems from the initial shock. Notably, in this study we are 
interested in examining the effects of systemic risks in the euro area banking network and the 
resilience of the banking system. Thus, our financial network does not allow for a role of the 
central bank or for any government interventions in providing liquidity or rescue packages to 
the distressed banks which require exogenous responses and might follow different rules.  
Thus, a bank is insolvent in our financial network when: 
for . (3)
Contagion occurs in the network system when either a bank is insolvent (equation (3)) 
or when fire sales - triggered by the propagation of a shock – are spread to other banks. 
Therefore, the likelihood of contagion corresponds and is directly linked to the size of the 
bank, the size of losses, the degree of interconnectedness and the size of the capital buffer. 
37 
The same relationship holds when the shock is propagated through the Asset Loan 
Channel. However, a shock propagated within the Sovereign Debt channel implies that the 
interbank loan and the asset backed securities markets are illiquid, because sovereign debt 
represents economic performance and credit conditions for a country and thus a priori 
liquidity will freeze in the interbank market while synchronically the price of collaterals will 
be severely harmed. Hence, amid to the direct interlinkages and obligations, the possibility of 
indirect financial contagion increases significantly when the shocks are triggered by the 
sovereign debt risk channel, such that equation (3) becomes:  
for (4)
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Appendix C. Network Measures 
In order to take into account the information provided by the Maximum Entropy 
method, we identify the appropriate quantities characterising the structure and organisation of 
our network at the statistical level. The appendix provides a general characterisation of the 
heterogenous statistical properties presents the number of sector-level nodes, the estimated 
degree, closeness, centrality, and the clustering coefficient. Degree is the sum of the direct 
links that each node has with other nodes. With closeness we capture the influence for each 
node. With centrality and betweenness we clarify the absolute position of the node in the 
banking network.  The clustering coefficient (CC) shows for a given node, the number of 
actual links to other nodes. 
Statistical properties of the Banking Network 
Network Measures
Nodes           48
Degree 1.54
CC 0.42
KIN  - KOUT 107,491
2.79
2.36
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Figure 1. The graph presents the network structure for the Interbank Loan Market cross-banking exposures. The 
nodes are the Banking Sectors (i.e. BS) for each euro area country. The links are the actual exposures from the 
Bank of International Settlements statistics and the different strength of the arrows and the links represents the 
different volumes (sizes) and the difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages. The 
domestic interbank exposures are estimated with the maximum entropy method.   
Figure 2. The graph depicts the network structure for the Asset-backed Loans (AL) and Sovereign Credit Risk 
(SCR) exposures. The nodes reflect actual exposures of each national banking sector. Each line represents the 
country from which the shock emerges. The strength of each link and each arrow exhibits the different volumes 
and the difference in the degree of interconnections for the bilateral interlinkages.
Figure 3. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% negative 
shock in their Sovereign Debt Markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated 
quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.
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Figure 4. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their Sovereign Debt markets (Sovereign Credit Risk Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-
quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
 Losses in the Italian Banking Sector   Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
Figure 5. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013.   
Losses in the German Banking Sector   Losses in the French Banking Sector  
Figure 6. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
their national Interbank Loan markets. The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013.    
Losses in the Italian Banking Sector   Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector
Figure 7. The graphs present losses in the German and French Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
the German and French Asset-Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-
by-quarter from 2005 till 2013.   
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Figure 8. The graphs exhibit losses in the Italian and Spanish Banking Systems generated from a 10% shock in 
the Asset-Backed Loans (Asset Loan Channel). The simulation tests are propagated quarter-by-quarter from 
2005 till 2013.   
 Losses in the Italian Banking Sector         Losses in the Spanish Banking Sector 
Figure 9. Total losses emerged in national banking systems from 10% negative shocks in three systemic risk 
channel. Panel A presents losses triggered in the Northern Euro Area banking sectors and Panel B exhibits 
losses caused in the Southern Euro Area banking sectors. The amounts are in EUR billions. 
PANEL A      PANEL B   
Figure 10. Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral  
Exposures (actual line) from a 5% negative shock in the German (Panel A) and the French (Panel B) Banking 
Systems. The results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
PANEL A PANEL B
Figure 11. Losses estimated with Entropy Maximisation (estimate line) and losses generated by actual bilateral  
Exposures (actual line) from a 10% negative shock in the Italian (Panel A) and the Spanish (Panel B) Banking 
Systems. The results are estimated quarter-by-quarter and the amounts are in EUR billions. 
PANEL A PANEL B
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Table 1
Impact of a 10% shock in the Sovereign Credit Risk Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in the 
national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 
2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect 
the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Austria - 3.377 - 4.089 - 3.336
Belgium - 3.128 - 3.788 - 3.090
Estonia - 0.025 - 0.031 - 0.025
Finland - 1.504 - 1.821 - 1.485
Germany - 29.201 - 31.880 - 26.003
Ireland - 1.615 - 1.956 - 1.596
Latvia - 0.087 - 0.105 - 0.086
Luxembourg - 0.050 - 0.060 - 0.049
Slovakia - 0.412 - 0.498 - 0.407
Southern Euro Area
France - 32.354 - 35.247 - 27.820
Greece - 3.086 - 3.847 - 3.036
Italy - 23.217 - 28.944 - 22.845
Malta - 0.107 - 0.133 - 0.105
Portugal - 2.485 - 3.098 - 2.445
Spain - 14.447 - 18.011 - 14.215
Slovenia - 0.299 - 0.363 - 0.296
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Table 2
Impact of a 10% shock in the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits the losses of a shock in the national 
banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 2005 till 2013. 
European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in order to reflect the 
effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Austria - 8.762 - 9.566 - 7.803
Belgium - 6.518 - 7.116 - 5.804
Estonia - 0.193 - 0.211 - 0.172
Finland - 4.787 - 5.227 - 4.263
Germany - 39.36 - 42.97 - 35.047
Ireland - 9.918 - 10.828 - 8.832
Latvia - 0.203 - 0.221 - 0.180
Luxembourg - 3.357 - 3.665 - 2.989
Slovakia - 0.384 - 0.419 - 0.342
Southern Euro Area
France - 73.933 - 80.545 - 63.571
Greece - 2.350 - 2.560 - 2.020
Italy - 27.035 - 29.453 - 23.246
Malta - 0.775 - 0.844 - 0.666
Portugal - 4.052 - 4.415 - 3.484
Spain - 26.245 - 28.592 - 22.567
Slovenia - 0.336 - 0.366 - 0.288
Table 3
Impact of a 10% shock in the Asset-Backed Loan Channel. The table depicts the losses of a shock in the 
national banking sectors for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis periods, quarter-by-quarter from 
2005 till 2013. European countries are divided in two regions: Northern Europe and Southern Europe in 
order to reflect the effects based on the geographical region. All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Northern Euro Area Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Austria - 5.331 - 5.820 - 4.747
Belgium - 7.531 - 8.222 - 6.706
Estonia - 0.180 - 0.197 - 0.160
Finland - 3.435 - 3.750 - 3.059
Germany - 30.59 - 33.40 - 27.241
Ireland - 10.975 - 11.982 - 9.773
Latvia - 0.130 - 0.141 - 0.115
Luxembourg - 10.698 - 11.679 - 9.526
Slovakia - 0.319 - 0.348 - 0.284
Southern Euro Area
France - 46.784 - 50.967 - 40.227
Greece - 1.367 - 1.490 - 1.176
Italy - 16.545 - 18.025 - 14.226
Malta - 0.305 - 0.332 - 0.262
Portugal - 2.733 - 2.978 - 2.350
Spain - 15.677 - 17.078 - 13.479
Slovenia - 0.256 - 0.279 - 0.220
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Table 4
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact 
of a 10% shock triggered by the three German Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), 
Interbank loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions. 
Germany SCR IB AL
France - 0.564 - 3.209 - 2.049
Italy - 0.404 - 2.298 - 1.467
Spain - 0.134 - 0.759 - 0.485
Belgium - 0.029 - 0.162 - 0.104
Austria - 0.130 - 0.736 - 0.470
Greece - 0.007 - 0.042 - 0.027
Finland - 0.015 - 0.086 - 0.055
Portugal - 0.009 - 0.051 - 0.032
Ireland - 0.010 - 0.058 - 0.037
Slovakia - 0.036 - 0.203 - 0.130
Slovenia - 0.043 - 0.243 - 0.155
Luxembourg - 0.032 - 0.184 - 0.117
Latvia - 0.062 - 0.353 - 0.225
Estonia - 0.064 - 0.361 - 0.231
Malta - 0.121 - 0.686 - 0.438
Total Losses - 1.660 - 9.433 - 6.023
Table 4   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three French Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
France SCR IB AL
Germany -0.202 -2.491 -1.352
Italy -0.041 -0.501 -0.272
Spain - 0.043 - 0.532 - 0.289
Belgium - 0.028 - 0.351 - 0.190
Austria - 0.029 - 0.352 - 0.191
Greece - 0.003 - 0.036 - 0.019
Finland - 0.008 - 0.096 - 0.052
Portugal - 0.009 - 0.112 - 0.061
Ireland - 0.012 - 0.143 - 0.078
Slovakia - 0.018 - 0.218 - 0.118
Slovenia - 0.021 - 0.260 - 0.141
Luxembourg - 0.016 - 0.197 - 0.107
Latvia - 0.031 - 0.378 - 0.205
Estonia - 0.031 - 0.387 - 0.210
Malta - 0.060 - 0.735 - 0.399
Total Losses - 0.551 - 6.789 - 3.686
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Table 5   
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Italy SCR IB AL
Germany - 0.301 - 1.536 - 0.689
France - 1.116 - 5.692 - 2.554
Spain - 0.081 - 0.411 - 0.184
Belgium - 0.027 - 0.136 - 0.061
Austria - 0.057 - 0.292 - 0.131
Greece - 0.020 - 0.103 - 0.046
Finland - 0.045 - 0.229 - 0.103
Portugal - 0.013 - 0.068 - 0.031
Ireland - 0.009 - 0.045 - 0.020
Slovakia - 0.024 - 0.124 - 0.055
Slovenia - 0.029 - 0.148 - 0.066
Luxembourg - 0.022 - 0.111 - 0.050
Latvia - 0.042 - 0.214 - 0.096
Estonia - 0.043 - 0.219 - 0.098
Malta - 0.082 - 0.416 - 0.187
Total Losses - 1.911 - 9.743 - 4.372
Table 5   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Italian Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Spain SCR IB AL
Germany - 0.118 - 1.431 - 0.721
France - 0.162 - 1.975 - 0.996
Italy - 0.019 - 0.236 - 0.119
Belgium - 0.012 - 0.145 - 0.073
Austria - 0.009 - 0.104 - 0.053
Greece - 0.007 - 0.087 - 0.044
Finland - 0.016 - 0.191 - 0.096
Portugal - 0.021 - 0.261 - 0.132
Ireland - 0.005 - 0.061 - 0.031
Slovakia - 0.008 - 0.102 - 0.051
Slovenia - 0.010 - 0.122 - 0.061
Luxembourg - 0.008 - 0.092 - 0.046
Latvia - 0.015 - 0.177 - 0.089
Estonia - 0.015 - 0.181 - 0.091
Malta - 0.028 - 0.344 - 0.173
Total Losses - 0.453 - 5.510 - 2.778
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Table 6   
Panel A Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Portuguese Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank 
loan Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Portugal SCR IB AL
Germany - 0.018 - 0.188 - 0.118
France - 0.018 - 0.193 - 0.121
Italy - 0.002 - 0.020 - 0.012
Spain - 0.059 - 0.630 - 0.396
Belgium - 0.005 - 0.050 - 0.031
Austria - 0.003 - 0.028 - 0.018
Greece - 0.003 - 0.030 - 0.019
Finland - 0.006 - 0.065 - 0.041
Ireland - 0.006 - 0.065 - 0.040
Slovakia - 0.003 - 0.035 - 0.022
Slovenia - 0.004 - 0.041 - 0.026
Luxembourg - 0.003 - 0.031 - 0.020
Latvia - 0.006 - 0.060 - 0.038
Estonia - 0.006 - 0.061 - 0.038
Malta - 0.011 - 0.117 - 0.073
Total Losses - 0.151 - 1.613 - 1.013
Table 6   
Panel B Euro Area banking network final losses. The table depicts cross-border quarter-by-quarter impact of a 
10% shock triggered by the three Greek Systemic Risk Channels: Sovereign Credit Risk (SCR), Interbank loan 
Market (IB) and Asset-backed Loan channel (AL). All the amounts are in Euro Billions.
Greece SCR IB AL
Germany - 0.002 - 0.070 - 0.037
France - 0.001 - 0.025 - 0.013
Italy - 0.000 - 0.010 - 0.005
Spain - 0.001 - 0.021 - 0.011
Belgium - 0.001 - 0.019 - 0.010
Austria - 0.001 - 0.028 - 0.014
Finland - 0.001 - 0.025 - 0.013
Portugal - 0.001 - 0.018 - 0.010
Ireland - 0.001 - 0.025 - 0.013
Slovakia - 0.000 - 0.013 - 0.007
Slovenia - 0.001 - 0.016 - 0.008
Luxembourg - 0.000 - 0.012 - 0.006
Latvia - 0.001 - 0.023 - 0.012
Estonia - 0.001 - 0.023 - 0.012
Malta - 0.001 - 0.044 - 0.023
Total Losses - 0.012 - 0.372 - 0.194
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Table 7
Bank defaults caused by the Sovereign Credit Risk channel. The table presents bank-failures generated 
by a 10% negative shock at the Sovereign Credit Risk channel and by banks whose default triggers a 
bank failure from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total 
capital buffers for each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and 
greater than 0.1.
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks
Austria 2 0 4 1
Belgium 2 0 4 1
Estonia 1 0 4 1
Finland 2 0 4 1
France 10 0 19 2
Germany 21 0 29 1
Greece 1 1 4 4
Ireland 2 0 5 1
Italy 2 0 3 1
Latvia 2 2 2 2
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0
Portugal 4 0 8 2
Slovakia 3 0 5 1
Slovenia 1 0 4 3
Spain 2 0 6 1
Table 8
Bank defaults prompted by the Asset-backed Loan channel. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 
10% negative shock at the Asset-backed Loan channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure 
from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers 
for each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1.
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks
Austria 0 0 0 0
Belgium 1 0 1 0
Estonia 0 0 0 0
Finland 1 0 1 0
France 2 0 6 0
Germany 3 0 9 0
Greece 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0 0
Latvia 1 1 2 2
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0
Portugal 1 0 0 0
Slovakia 1 0 0 0
Slovenia 1 0 1 0
Spain 1 0 2 0
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Table 9
Bank defaults provoked by the Interbank Loan Market. The table exhibits bank-failures generated by a 10% 
negative shock at the Interbank Loan Market channel and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure 
from the propagation of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for 
each banking system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1.
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks
Austria 1 0 3 1
Belgium 2 0 4 1
Estonia 1 0 4 1
Finland 1 0 2 0
France 6 0 11 0
Germany 13 0 17 0
Greece 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 0 2 0
Italy 1 0 2 0
Latvia 2 2 2 2
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0
Portugal 2 0 6 0
Slovakia 1 0 3 0
Slovenia 1 0 4 3
Spain 1 0 3 0
Table 10
Cross-border Euro Area bank defaults provoked  by a 10% negative shock in the German Interbank Loan 
Market. The table displays bank-failures in the Euro Area, generated by a 10% negative shock at the 
German Interbank Loan Market and by banks whose default triggers a bank failure from the propagation 
of financial contagion. The propagation takes into account the total capital buffers for each banking 
system, while most of the banks are contagious for a loss rate equal and greater than 0.1.
COUNTRY Banks failing by losses Banks failing by Contagion
Number of banks Large banks Number of banks Large banks
Austria 3 0 5 1
Belgium 4 1 4 1
Estonia 2 0 4 1
Finland 2 0 4 1
France 14 0 21 3
Greece 4 0 7 2
Ireland 3 1 3 1
Italy 2 2 2 2
Latvia 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Malta 6 0 9 3
Portugal 5 1 5 1
Slovakia 4 3 4 3
Slovenia 6 1 7 2
Spain 3 0 5 1
